Hi and Welcome To My Domestic Violence Blog

My name is Sue, I am the owner of this blog on domestic violence and I hope that you will find it informative and enjoyable I am a survivor of domestic violence. I used my experiences to undertake doctoral research into the social and religious factors that contributed to the abuse of women. The text below is an overall introduction to the thesis.

A Theology of Survival: The Faith Narratives of Women Who Have Survived Domestic Violence

Introduction

This thesis makes a contribution to feminist liberation theology, and offers new insights into the identities of women who have experienced domestic violence. Using data drawn from the experiences and reflections of these women a thesis is developed that a theology of survival might be more appropriate for women in this situation than a theology of liberation. An important aspect of this thesis is that such a use of empirical data brings the voices of marginalised women directly into academic debate. This is done through a conversation with academic feminist theology. The resulting findings are then used in the act of theological construction. This work might be seen as a specific contribution to theological thinking in general and to critical reflection on the nature of theology. My own experience of religion, and of studying religion, had developed in me the conviction that religion could be a means to empowerment for women in spite of the fact that its power structures are predominantly patriarchal. I believed that my first task was to find a context in which I could ground the thesis that religion could be liberative. Then, through data gained from empirical research, I could evaluate the extent to which the thesis was valid. I discovered that the seeds were located in my own life history and they are the seeds which have informed and motivated the research process.

2. The Thesis and Its Structure

This thesis is divided into four main parts. The first section, chapters one and two, gives an overview of the thesis and deals with background issues. The second section is concerned with feminist theologies and the problematic nature of women’s experience. There are many different feminist theologies, but what prompted my questions was that some forms of academic feminist theology seemed to be making the same mistakes as ‘male’ theology. What I mean by this is that the theology they proposed, while it was drawn from personal experience, seemed to assume that this experience was the same for other women and thus spoke for them all. It was almost a didactic approach which said that women must feel this way. Certainly this has not been so in feminist pastoral theology where “hearing into speech” has become an important aspect of their work. I have only ‘skirted’ pastoral theology for two reasons. First my questioning began with certain forms of academic feminist theology and secondly, I did not believe there was enough scope to cover every position. I have, however, referred briefly to some of this work. Thus, this is not a criticism of feminist theology in general, but of some feminist theological positions in particular. At times my choice may seem unfairly balanced to the reader, but there were certain viewpoints that I wished to challenge through research into the experiences of other, more marginalised women.

 

Within the chapter on feminist theology and women’s experience, symbolism comes to the fore. The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly I wished to investigate how far feminist theological critique affected the lives of other women. I wanted to know whether their critique of religious symbols resonated with the experience of non-academic women and influenced the way in which women believe. Secondly, as analysis of the fieldwork data progressed, the way in which abused women had themselves been symbolised gained increasing importance. This was a crucial factor in the formation of their identities. The third part of the thesis is concerned with the fieldwork. Chapter four begins with the development of the methodology, my research methods, the problems I encountered and my own part in the research process. Chapters five and six attempt to show, through an analysis of empirical evidence, the effects of domestic violence and the contrast between public images of abused women and their private identities.

 

Section four, chapters seven and eight, examines the place of personal faith in the formation of both the women’s identities and their theological thinking. The theological part involves a conversation between the women’s stories and academic feminist theology. Chapter eight draws the strands of the thesis together (this also gives an explanation of how and why I modified my own theoretical position). The chapter involves the use of an interpretative theological scheme through which the experiences of the women might be viewed.

 

3. The Research Question

I am a survivor of domestic violence who has found both faith and religion empowering. As a result of this, I wished to investigate both the emancipatory and oppressive dimensions of religion and personal faith in the experiences of other women who had suffered domestic abuse. Although domestic violence often involves sexual violence this was not referred to in the interviews I undertook, primarily I think, because the question was not asked. Again this was an area that I decided to refer to briefly and then leave alone due to the constraints of the thesis. In the academic field there was, until recently, very little published research into the connection between religion and violence in the home. This was particularly the case when one enquired into the role of religion in the lives of women who have suffered violence.

 

Towards the end of 1995 I reviewed a book called “Women in the Presence” (Shapiro Davie, 1995). Professor Davie identified a gap between the work of feminist theologians and the experiences of women at grass-roots level. Professor Davie argues that there is very little empirical research into the religious experiences of ordinary women. In addition, she states that too much feminist theology is limited to the personal experience of the writer. In her view this prompted the writer to engage in abstract arguments, whereby the connections between the writer’s experience and the experiences of other women was assumed, rather than argued for. I thus decided that the greater part of my research would bring together in dialogue the experiences of a group of women with existing feminist theological theory. I thought it appropriate to use the experiences of a group of women who have not had much voice in theological circles. Drawing on my own previous history, I decided to interview women who had experienced domestic violence. Since Hoff’s (1990) work, the current preferred terminology for those women who have been abused is ‘survivors of domestic violence.’

 

As I have already said preliminary literature review revealed very little published research into the connection between faith and the survival of domestic abuse. Other than specifically pastoral theology, at that time I could locate only one paper by Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite (1985). In view of this is seemed to me appropriate to examine the link between women’s experience of domestic violence and their experience of religion and to compare this with academic debates. This would serve a number of purposes:

 

a).It would contribute to the debate on the nature of the identities of women who . had experienced domestic violence.

b). It would aim to bring the experiences and the voices of ordinary women into theological debate, thereby reducing the gap identified by other researchers.

 

c). It would aim to contextualize feminist critiques of religious and social structures.

 

d). It would provide empirical data for a contextual, constructed theology.

 

The study then, encompasses both feminism and feminist theologies, and uses the narratives of women who have experienced domestic violence in conversation with the claims and criticisms of academic feminist theologies. On the sociological level it questions existing theory with regard to the nature of the identities of abused women. At the theological level it asks how these women experience religion, what effects it may have had on their life situation, and how they might utilise religious traditions. The purpose of the conversation with academic feminist theologies is to discuss how far these theories may differ from, or agree with, the women’s experiences. More importantly, the study questions the claims of some academic feminist theology and through the women’s experiences, critiques feminist critiques of traditional religion. It is this critique which allows the thesis to offer new insights into facets of the theological task. The women in this study come from a number of different faith traditions and from none and I shall argue that,

 

(a) The ‘personal faith’ of the women in this study has been a significant factor in their survival of domestic violence.

(b) While they recognize the oppressive potential (and reality) which both religious texts and symbols engender, their continued religious affiliation has been used to provide both hope and the determination to survive.

 

(c) The way in which these women utilise religious traditions is in contrast to the verdict of numbers of feminist theologians who seek women’s liberation from the constraints of patriarchal religions.

 

(d) The women’s understanding of personal faith, (which is discussed further on), allows the development of a concept of ‘survival theology’ which transcends traditional religious boundaries and secular theories. It is this concept of personal faith that the thesis seeks to explore. Central to my concept of faith and my theological thinking will be Karl Rahner’s (1974, 1978) concept of the transcendental and his use of the transcendental subject.

 

From a sociological viewpoint, the women in the study are a very limited sample, perhaps more of an extended case study than anything else. While I had sent out questionnaires, I have only used some of this data to strengthen the twelve narratives which are the basis of my thesis. The participants are, in most instances, drawn from the Derby area. Any conclusions which may arise from the study are, therefore, only considered applicable to other women who have experienced domestic violence in so far as they may echo their experiences. While I wish to avoid the danger of universalising based on these experiences, it is my argument that these experiences may be very similar to those of other women.

 

The thesis, therefore, attempts to offer a new development in discussions on the nature of theology. This theology is outlined in terms of the notion of “Survival Theology,” rooted in the praxis and reflection of those who have experienced domestic violence. When I began my doctoral research my main concern was theological. I also wished, however, to make a comparison between the theories and arguments of feminist theologians and the experiences, opinions and beliefs of a specific group of women. This posed several problems. How would I integrate empirical data with theological concepts, would it be possible? How could I construct a theology that consisted of the beliefs of Christian, Islamic, and Sikh women and women who have what might be termed as a secular spirituality? In what ways could the use of this data be said to count as knowledge? Contained within this thesis therefore, are a number of issues and presuppositions that need some clarification at the outset.

4. Key Concepts

i) Feminism and Feminist Theology

Feminism is a political movement that responds to, and challenges, the mores of patriarchal society. The roots of feminism date back to the eighteenth century. Early feminists, (for example Mary Wollstonecraft, 1792), argued for the equality of women with men. This call was later taken up in the United States by Mary Fuller and Elizabeth Cady-Stanton, and resulted in the Declaration of the Rights of Women at the first Women’s Rights Convention, held at Seneca Falls, America in 1848.

 

Most contemporary feminists refer to the renewed struggle for women’s rights as ’second-wave feminism.’ This began in the nineteen sixties, and was influenced by such texts as “The Feminist Mystique” (Freidan, B 1965). Rowbotham (1997) argues that feminine stereotyping, combined with conflicting messages of desirable womanhood, led Freidan to write of the “problem that had no name” in the lives of American Housewives. Once the black civil rights movement took off in the mid-sixties the women’s agenda became far more political. As McGrath (1993) argues,

 

Feminism has come to be a significant component of modern western culture. At its heart, feminism is a global movement working towards the emancipation of women. The older term for the movement-’women’s liberation’- expressed the fact that it is at heart a liberation movement directing its efforts toward achieving equality for women in modern society, especially through the removal of obstacles-including beliefs, values, and attitudes- which hinder that process (McGrath, 1993:111).

 

British feminists were ten years behind their American sisters in the struggle for women’s equality with men. Nowadays all feminists believe that ‘the personal is political’. The 19^th century distinction between the public and the private spheres meant that what happened in the home was seen as a private matter. Feminists struggle to bring previously private matters into the public arena. In this way they challenge assumptions that women are inferior to men, and that the domestic sphere is beyond the realm of justice.

 

Abbott and Wallace (1997) argue that within feminism however, there is often seen to be a dichotomy between those feminists who are grass-roots activists, and feminist theorists. Although in the last twenty years there have been feminists who have tried to bridge this gap there is still concern among grass-roots feminists that some researchers work on a ‘rape model.’

 

Grass-roots activists are those feminists who demonstrate for political causes these include those who campaign women’s equal rights with men, or peace activists like the women of Greenham Common. In addition to these things, activists often staff refuges for women who have been abused. My own experience with the gatekeepers of women’s refuges also showed a resistance on the part of these workers to co-operate in a research exercise aimed at bridging the identified gap between activists and theorists.

 

Academic feminists research and write about women’s life experiences (Harding, 1987; Stanley and Wise, 1993; Abbott and Wallace, 1997). These women examine and critique the structures of power that are at work both within the academy and within society at large. Things are beginning to change, however, as each side comes to recognise the work that is being done by others. It is more common nowadays to find activists participating in conferences, and to find academics who are also involved in grass-roots movements.

 

Feminist theologians are those feminists who research and write about women’s religious experiences, and their roles within the religions. They point to what they claim is the intrinsic, oppressive nature, of both scripture and tradition. It is through the use of women’s experiences and a Marxist hermeneutic that these feminists attempt to address the structural oppression that is a part of contemporary society. This oppression, they argue, is also evident within academic theology, and within the religions themselves. There are different kinds of feminism and these can, broadly, be classified under the following headings:

ii) Liberal and Reformist feminism.

The main aim is to achieve equality with men. The demand for equal pay for equal work and equal opportunity are examples of this. Liberal feminists argue that a woman’s sex should not determine her rights. Abbott and Wallace (1997) and others argue that many of the differences between men and women are not innate. Rather, they are a result of socialisation and the enactment of prescribed, gender identities that portray men as rational, and women as emotional. Liberal feminists seek to work within the system and reform it. Some feminists, in particular Abbott and Wallace (1997), argue that liberal feminism is not an adequate challenge to patriarchal concepts and structures because it remains within a patriarchal framework. It is often bound by the patriarchal categories which have been so damaging to women. What is needed is a new conceptualisation that is not drawn from categories of domination.

 

Within the theological arena, liberal reformist feminists are by far the largest group, and include writers such as Rosemary Radford-Ruether (1983, 1992), and Elisabeth Schussler-Fiorenza (1984, 1990). Liberal reformist feminist theologians are also found in both Islam and Hinduism, particularly Gupta (1991) and Mernissi (1991). All of these women argue that their position as reformists is valid because in their opinion there is a message of liberation inherent in the tradition. This message subverts patriarchal categories of domination.

iii) Socialist feminism.

Socialist feminists argue that women have been subjected to a specific kind of oppression that has been worsened by their exclusion from the paid labour force. Women have been the hidden workforce because labour in the home is not recognised as work. They have supported, by default, the capitalist system which keeps them in subjection (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). The key to women’s oppression is the familial system that is part of Western society. Socialist feminists, therefore, reject the notion that equal rights within a socialist state are the key to women’s liberation. Rather, the key is in achieving economic independence within a socialist state. Abbott and Wallace (1997) hold that while it is right to concentrate on class and economic oppression, socialist or Marxist feminism often fails to take sufficient account of the many ways in which men oppress women. A further development of socialist, or Marxist feminism, is dual system feminism. Dual system feminists argue for a Marxist analysis of society coupled with an analysis of patriarchy, because patriarchy is not static and is not confined to familial relationships. Walby (1986) argues that the constraints of patriarchy are not restricted to the private sphere. Women may be subject to as much control in the workplace as they have been, and often still are, in the home. I think that I would probably include standpoint feminism under this heading because it often refers to those feminists who argue that issues explored from women’s standpoint are a valid base for knowledge. This, furthermore, provides a less distorted view of reality than traditional male standpoints. In a sense many feminist theologians could be said to be standpoint feminists because of their criticism that traditional patriarchal religion gives a distorted theological view of human experience. Women’s experience is always subsumed under the male (Abbott and Wallace, 1997; Ruether, 1983, 1992; et al).

 

The religious equivalent of secular dual system feminism would be Womanist theology. Womanist theologians, (Delores Williams, 1990; Jaclyn Grant, 1989 et al), argue for an analysis of class and race, as well as an analysis of patriarchy. This is something that is reiterated by American writer Susan Brooks-Thistlethwaite (1990) in her work with women who have experienced violence. She argues that women’s concerns, and in particular the violence perpetrated against women, are not things which should be considered in isolation. These matters should be examined in connection with other factors which may be at work in the women’s lives and in society at large. Thus, she writes:

A great deal of the violence that is perpetrated against women is what is sometimes called ‘horizontal violence’(Brooks-Thistlethwaite, 1990:73).

 

This is the reactive violence of one oppressed person or persons against other oppressed people. In the West this is generally due to financial pressure and is one reason why violence against women should be researched in connection with the analysis of other social oppressions such as race and class.

iv) Radical feminism

Radical feminists believe that both of the foregoing alternatives still accord with male stereotypes of women. This is because both reform and the critique of capitalism are still operating from within a patriarchal structure. Abbott and Wallace (1997) argue that the familial system is essential to the continued oppression of women through motherhood and ‘sexual slavery.’ Radical feminists question the whole of women’s experience of the world. They say there is no area of that experience which is free from patriarchal constraints. Thus, they argue for a specifically female consciousness, which leads in one of two ways. Firstly it leads to woman centred communities, as in the American Jewish community initiated through the work of the Jewish feminist Judith Plaskow (1989). The second direction often results in virulent anti-masculine attitudes which characterise all men as oppressors (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). The chief proponent of this has been the American feminist Mary Daly (1973, 1986). Daly calls for women to separate themselves from patriarchal space. Men need to repudiate the norms of patriarchal society and join women in their fight against phallo-centric language and oppressive patriarchal structures (Daly, 1973, 1986). While this is more of an American phenomenon than a European one, it is germane because of the widespread influence of Daly’s thought. The anti-male attitudes, which are evident in her work, are also to a lesser extent to be found in the work of British theologian, Daphne Hampson (1990, 1996 ed.). Hampson states that she has no interest in men’s experiences of oppression, only in the oppression that women may experience (1990). Unfortunately this approach polarises the sexes and leaves patriarchal society and religion as it is. This then perpetuates women’s oppression.

 

The foregoing definitions of feminism may appear as clear distinctions. In reality, however, these theoretical distinctions are not so apparent. Feminism’s claims and criticisms often overlap. While it is possible to identify some of the most radical feminists, it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between those who are liberal reformist, and those who are socialist feminists. I would argue that the above definitions, while a useful introduction to feminism, are far too simplistic. Radical feminism, for example, has come to mean those feminists who, by and large, wish to have nothing to do with what Mary Daly (1973, 1986) terms “patriarchal space.” This is not, arguably, a truly radical position because it attempts to dispense with the problem rather than to get to the root of it. My own position is that some forms of feminism come close to exchanging one unbalanced system for another equally unbalanced one, in that they use the terms ‘woman’ and ‘experience’ in an abstract way. In my view theoretical reasoning is, in itself, of little practical use in promoting the equality of women with men.

 

I believe that the women in this study, while they may not own to the name of feminist truly are engaged in the struggle for equality. They have developed the ability to think through situations (and belief structures) and achieve a degree of autonomy through their right to make choices. It is too easy to forget that within, and in spite of, the oppressive structures of patriarchy women have chosen to do what they think is best in relation to these structures, and to take responsibility for the consequences. This was something that Tiongo and White (1997) found with other oppressed and marginalised women. In the developing world women use many strategies to resist oppression. Some researchers initially saw these women as colluding in their own oppression. They later conceded that the women saw themselves in charge of the situation (Tiongo and White, 1997). I would argue that all these women have a feminist consciousness, whether or not they call themselves by that name.

 

The foregoing may seem highly critical of the feminist agenda. It is not, however, intended to refute the enormous steps forward that women have taken through the work of both grass roots and academic feminists. These women have struggled against injustice and oppression, and against the power structures at work in society, in religion, and in the academy.

 

In the academic context feminists criticise the traditional modes of knowledge production. They state that women’s experiences have not been taken into account when knowledge is produced. Feminist theologians argue the same thing for religious or theological knowledge. They say that, historically, its leaders have taken little or no account of women’s particular experiences in theological formulation.

v) Religion

Religious traditions and their teachings are, it might be argued, the result of three things, faith, theology, and culture. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1966) describes religion thus:

1. A system of symbols which acts to 2. Establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by 3. Formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 4. Clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 5. The moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz, 1966:4).

 

Members of religious communities and the theologians who attempt to interpret the tradition see religion as an outworking of a faith that is already held. Sociologists on the other hand, may argue that religion is a system of symbols which acts a-priori to influence people’s beliefs. This view holds that the symbols play a part in the assumption that religious belief is the result of socialisation. This, I would argue, ignores what Merleau-Ponty and others (Bush, T and Gallagher, S, 1992) have called the “intentionality of human beings” as (in some measure) autonomous creatures and concentrates on the way in which culture shapes our thinking. The argument that all we are is a product of our culture leaves no room for an a-priori consciousness, such as Schleiermacher’s 1834 concept of absolute dependence (1928 2^nd Edition) which is able to transcend and transform that culture. It is in this context that Stuart Sutherland (1984) speaks of,

 

the belief that there is an understanding of the affairs of men that is not relative to the individual, community, or age (Sutherland, 1984:88).

 

There needs, therefore, to be more investigation into how agents create meanings which defy the processes of socialisation. Most academic discourse is about different ways of knowing/thinking/believing. Without concrete subjects and their praxis however, it remains discourse. On the other hand, what Guru Nanak (McLeod, 1980) has called ‘true religion,’ and Bonhoeffer (Bethge, E, ed. 1977) ‘costly grace,’ (costly both to the giver and the receiver) is about different ways of being rather than believing. What both Nanak and Bonhoeffer are pointing to is not simply an academic understanding, but rather a fundamental condition of what it means to be a human being. At the heart of this way of being is what has come to be known as faith.

vi) Faith

I use the concept of ‘personal faith’ to distinguish it from faith that is associated with organised religion and dogmatic formulations. The category of faith as employed in this thesis is best explained by Macquarrie’s (1966) use of Tillich (1951):

 

Faith is not simply an intellectual assent, but an existential attitude of the whole self, an attitude of acceptance and commitment in the face of being (Tillich, 1951:115).

 

Within the Christian tradition faith has been variously described as a feeling, or consciousness of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher, 1834), ultimate concern, (Tillich, 1951, 1964), authentic being, (Bultmann, 1957). The idea of authentic existence is to be found in the thought of Martin Heidegger (1927, tr. Macquarrie and Robinson, 1962)) who held that authentic being meant personal responsibility and a chosen identity. Bultmann (1957) and Rahner (1974, 1978) extended the concept of authentic existence in the theological arena. Human responsibility lay not in some external authority, but at the source of an individual’s being (what Christians call God). Authentic existence is, therefore, a way of being in the world. This way of being should be in accord with one’s deepest sense of who one is, and what one should be doing (Hart, 1997). This thesis rests on an ontology which argues that the intentions of these women to live worthwhile and successful lives in the face of human finitude implies an attitude of faith which might be seen as sharing a common ontological ground (whether this is existential or metaphysical is open to interpretation). It is my argument that the faith of the women in the study is rooted in what Rahner (1974, 1978) has called an apriori transcendence. In his work transcendence is a condition of human thought and an orientation towards a reality that points beyond the empirical world, or transcends it. For Rahner it is this transcendence which is the underpinning of faith (Kilby, 1997). A theology based on empirical evidence would, arguably, provide a more pragmatic basis for theology which can become too theoretical and estranged from ordinary lived experience. This thesis attempts to show, through the experiences and personal faith of the women in the study, that theology and immediate experience may be seen as closely related.

 

One of the problems for theology has been whether God may be understood as a being or as Being itself. It seems clear that the biblical writers, particularly the Psalmists, for all their anthropomorphic statements clearly understood this problem. They used many different analogies to speak of God. Analogy contains within it similarities of relationship and makes being more accessible. The original meaning of analogy was ‘according to a ratio’ (Macquarrie, 1966 ibid.). As Macquarrie points out the similarity of relations does not reduce the idea of Being to purely human subjectivity. Rather, the use of analogy discloses Being as it is related to us. In this way the relationship to, and the difference between, Being and beings is preserved. God is only equated with a particular being for example “father” when analogous statements are reified. What we call God is then made into an object with similar implications of idolatry as the biblical story of the golden calf. Analogies therefore, provide ways for human beings to speak of God or transcendent being in personal terms, while at the same time preserving distinctions between them.

vii) Theology and Theological Method

Macquarrie (1966) gives a clear definition of what he considers theology to be, and I quote it at some length:

 

Whereas faith is an attitude of the whole (wo) man and expresses itself in many fashions, notably in action, and in a way of life, theology, as the very name implies, is discourse, and although it is rooted in the total life of faith, it aims at verbal expression. In intending that its language shall be the clearest and most coherent possible, theology shares the character of all intellectual enterprises, for they all aim at intelligibility and consistency (Macquarrie, 1966:3).

 

Perhaps one of the best known and most often used definitions of theology has been Anselm of Canterbury’s ‘fides quaerens intellectum,’ faith seeking understanding. Solle (1990) writes,

 

This definition of theology contains three elements: a presupposition (fides), a reflexive action (quaerens), and a result (intellectum) (Solle, 1990:4).

 

It is obvious from this that if one undertakes the task of theology, even as an atheist, it is an exercise in understanding. Theology therefore might best be understood as the critical self-reflection of faith. Gutierrez (1973) says that theology is a second order discipline rather than a set of a-priori dogmatic formulations. The problem with traditional systematic theology is that it has at times been reduced to theoretical speculation. While philosophical theologies such as Tillich’s (1951) depth theology were broader based and expanded theological concepts beyond simply dogmatic formulation, such work still remained a largely theoretical systematisation.

 

Liberation theologies have shifted the concept of theology away from the purely theoretical to a critical reflection on praxis. Theology in this context is not simply theoretical but is praxis-centred. It is reflection on lived experience and ethical practice. This is not to negate the work of theologians such as Tillich (1951) (whose concept of ultimate concern included atheists) but to extend it more fully through reflection on concrete experiences. Gutierrez (1973) argues that it is not the task of theology to tell people what to do, rather reflective theology makes action more coherent. Thus he writes,

 

Theology is a reflection-that is, a second act, a turning back, a reflecting, that comes after action. Theology is not first, the commitment is first. Theology is the understanding of the commitment and the commitment is action. The central action is charity, which involves commitment, while theology arrives later on (Gutierrez, 1973:63).

 

Theologians, therefore, grapple with the realities and conditions of human life in an effort to understand what gives life meaning, and this should be done with an appropriate balance, of theory and praxis. Theology, it has been said, is ‘God talk’ and refers to what may also be termed the transcendent or the ultimate. This is a way of seeking to articulate that which can never be fully expressed. In theology we are in Buddhist terms speaking of ‘not this and not this,’ and in the Western Catholic tradition, the via-negativa, or way of unknowing, or the apophatic theology of the Eastern Orthodox tradition. This concentrates on what God is not rather than on what God is. It is this way which understands and risks the possibility that expressions of transcendent meaning may be illusory. What is evident from this is the elusive nature of the subject matter of theology. This elusiveness makes theological discourse problematic in intellectual terms (Wiles, 1976). Tillich (1951, 1964) also recognised this difficulty but still believed that theological discourse was relevant to the believer and non-believer alike. Thus, he wrote:

 

The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God. That depth is what the word God means. And if that word has no such meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God, perhaps even the word itself. For if, you know that God means depth, you know much about him. You cannot then call yourself an atheist or an unbeliever. For you cannot think or say, life has no depth! Life is shallow. Being itself is surface only. If you could say this in complete seriousness, you would be an atheist, but otherwise you are not. S/he who knows about depth knows about God (1962, 63-4).

 

However, as Wiles (1976) points out, this does not provide us with a suitable answer as to what the subject matter of theology is. It is as problematic to speak of ‘depth’, in intellectual discourse, as it is to speak of the ‘not this and not this,’ of Buddhism. Wiles (1976), suggests that perhaps theology might best be defined as a clarification of religious faith through its documents and the life of the community.

 

viii) Contextual Theology

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in what has come to be known as contextual theology. In England, there has also been a rise in the number of people involved in community action, who then use that action for theological reflection. This is particularly the case in depressed urban areas (Green, 1990). Contextual theologies are, like liberation theologies, the articulation of belief through praxis. These are concerned, as Gutierrez says, with “the aspirations of oppressed people and social classes.” (1973, 1988:24).This type of theology usually takes place within a (Christian) believing community, and the experience is then used to reformulate traditional Christologies or doctrines of providence and sin. My work differs from this in a number of respects. The theological reflection here has not been undertaken within an established community of believers, it does not restrict texts to the use of sacred texts and it uses women’s own words in theological construction. However, it remains contextual in the sense that it works on the basis of contextual praxis. This thesis may be seen as similar to urban contextual theology. However, this kind of theology does not, generally, approach the subject from an academic standpoint. What literature there is appears to be mostly of a popular and devotional nature. The exception to this is probably the work of the Urban Theology Unit at Sheffield. Consequently this thesis crosses both religious and disciplinary boundaries, religious because the women come from differing faith traditions, and disciplinary through the use of feminist epistemologies and social research methods. My context is the women’s experience of domestic violence coupled with their personal faith.

 

From this it may be seen that I am attempting to construct from my analysis of the women’s narratives a theology from below. This is a theology that draws its concepts from the women’s stories rather using than a-historical concepts, which may have little or no bearing in a contemporary context. A contextual theology then takes whichever method is most appropriate and uses that method as a “mediating framework” (Reader, 1994:12) to interpret experience in terms of theological concepts. However, these concepts have, historically, been used in a way that seems determinative of the experiences of faith and belief. What I have done is start with the experiences and discover what theological concepts might arise from the data.

 

While Reader acknowledges that situated theology can, “raise a question about the unity and coherence of the Christian faith” (1994:2) he also acknowledges that continuing to adopt ‘traditional’ ways of formulating theology can leave it with nothing to say to specific groups. Contextual theologies must, therefore, be able to speak to a wider audience and experience.

xi) Epistemology

Epistemology may be defined as the theory of knowledge in that it attempts to answer the question of how we know what we know. For the Greek philosopher Plato, reason had a metaphysical status. Everything in the world was a representation, a sort of dim image of what we had once known. Plato believed that we could have knowledge of things as they were in themselves. The leap forward in scientific progress in the seventeenth century resulted in a new way of speaking about the world. This period has been called the Enlightenment. There were a number of central themes that emerged from the Enlightenment. Reader (1997) defines them as follows:

 

An emphasis on the primacy of reason as the correct way of organising knowledge, a concentration on empirical data accessible to all and a belief that human progress was to be achieved by the application of science and reason (1997:4).

 

This emphasis on the relationship between human progress and reason resulted in what has come to be known as the rise of modernism. The historical rise of modernity was the outcome of social, cultural, political and economic processes. It was also the result of a new way of thinking that stemmed from events like the American struggle for independence, and the French Revolution (Graham, 1996). A new scientific understanding of the world emphasised the fact that knowledge of the world could be obtained by scientifically observable, and verifiable, facts. Scientific knowledge, therefore, was governed by systematic methods and by the exercise of reason.

 

x) Epistemology and Theology

Enlightenment rationalism and its concentration on the importance of reason, constituted a paradigm shift in theology. My use of the concept ‘paradigm’ is the same as that of Thomas Kuhn (1970):

 

The general constellation of convictions, values and modes of experience which are shared by a particular community (Kuhn, 1970:175).

 

The dogmatic method of formulating doctrine as ‘truths’ based on revelation and the authority of scripture and tradition was called into question by new methods which emphasised the primacy of reason. As a result of claims for the primacy of reason, traditional theological methods were replaced with scientific methods of proof and historicity. Critical reason was judged competent in all areas of human knowing. Thus it seemed justifiable to examine the beliefs and practices of religion in the light of reason, and to dispense with those judged to be based on superstition. Enlightenment thought, particularly that of Hume (1740) and Kant (1787) ran contrary to Plato’s belief that knowledge had metaphysical status (Honderitch, T ed. 1995). Kant (1787) differentiated between the noumena and the phenomena. The noumena are things in themselves and the phenomena their appearance. Kant believed that we gained knowledge of the world through sense experience, and a-priori categories of the mind enabled us to interpret that experience. Kant’s thinking constituted a complete change in traditional ways of thinking, and has been called the Copernican revolution in philosophy. In Kant’s thought, previously held ways of knowing are reversed. What this means is that knowledge claims are not rooted in some external metaphysical reality or in reason, but in human experience and consciousness. Instead of our knowledge being shaped by the objects around us, our knowledge or perception of them shapes the objects. Therefore, because God was not an object in the world, Kant doubted the legitimacy of human speech about God.

.

The Enlightenment project, which questioned human ways of knowing the world, also critiqued and called into question the religious authority which governed human affairs. The philosophers believed that the scientific, the religious, and the social world that we inhabit were all subject to rational enquiry. Numbers of thinkers however, questioned this assumption. These thinkers believed that faith was not at the mercy of reason. As Kierkegaard 1843 (Honderitch, T ed. 1995) argued there are things which reason cannot understand. This does not make faith incompatible with reason; it is simply, different (Hart, 1997). Kant had tried to ensure that reason still left room for faith. However, he failed to show how faith in God might relate to life, and eventually transform it. This led Schleiermacher (1834) to argue that Kant had not left room for authentic faith in God. Rather, he had sat on the fence and, in doing so, had made God an optional extra. Thus, modernity, with its implicit understanding of the absolute powers of reason, called into question the traditional understandings of theological truth claims and drastically reduced the cultural influence of theology.

 

The epistemological turn towards autonomous reason presented a direct challenge to theology’s Trinitarian grounding in revelation, tradition and authority (Batstone et al, 1997:12).

Since then theologians and others have grappled with the problem of what kind of knowledge theology could be said to be. How can we claim to have knowledge of God? Schleiermacher (1834) is known as the father of modern Protestant theology and within his thought faith may be seen as prior to knowledge. According to Schleiermacher, the basic human condition is that of faith, and he sees that as best expressed as a consciousness of human dependence within the world. Thus, we are dependent on our culture, our environment, and we rely on the weather for growing our food. Dependency is a basic fact of human existence, which Schleiermacher (1834) uses to describe faith. More than this, Schleiermacher writes that this dependence is an awareness of God. Furthermore, religions are cultural manifestations of that basic attitude of faith. Theology then, is the critical reflection of faith in relation to itself. This is what has come to be known as the theological circle. Schleiermacher’s claim that a feeling of dependence could be equated with an awareness of God proved problematic for traditional theology. As Barth (1947) said, the subjective nature of this theology had turned theology into anthropology and resulted in Feuerbach’s (1841) conception of religion as human projection.

 

After Schleiermacher, modern theologians have (in different ways), been seeking to provide epistemological warrants for the primacy of faith. Barth (1947) emphasised the primacy of revelation, and many believe that he wanted to revert to pre-modern ways of believing. He categorically denied that man’s search for God was effective. Barth believed that human beings could only respond to God through God’s initiative. Paul Tillich (1951), attempted to address these questions through the concept of ontology, (theories of being and existence) and through the method of correlation. Phillips (1965) drew upon the concept of expressivism. Expressivism states that one does not ask whether God exists, but rather what a person means when they express a belief in God, and when they use religious language. Phillips’ method is an extension of the language games of Wittgenstein. Pailin (1986) says that Wittgenstein held that what people mean when they speak of God, or of prayer, can only be examined and understood in the context in which these words are used. Such epistemological warrants do not constitute knowledge itself. Rather, theology bears witness to faith’s intuition of the meaningful and purposive nature of existence. Thus, knowledge, within theology, is not the same as empirical knowledge. Rather, theology is an exploration of the faith that acts as the foundation of the ground of all our knowing. Theology, I believe, is an attempt to interpret what Hegel (when speaking of inexpressible beauty) called disclosures in a way that makes sense to the human mind and is the reason that we feel a need for religious symbols. This is why Karl Rahner (1974, 1978), like Kant, began from the human condition. He argued that human relation to the given world and the attempt to make sense of it is openness to transcendence, that is to say, the meaningfulness ‘beyond the world.’ In this sense everything we know, and everything we experience, is an experience of God (Kilby, 1997). Thus, Kant was right when he asserted that God was not simply an object in the world, to be known like other objects. Rather, God is absolute mystery and the ground of all our knowing, thinking, and believing.

 

Man is he who is always confronted with the holy mystery, even where he is dealing with what is within hand’s reach, comprehensible and amenable to a conceptual framework….the holy mystery is not something upon which man may ‘also’ stumble, if he is lucky and takes an interest in something else besides the definable objects within the horizon of his consciousness. Man always lives by the holy mystery, even where he is not conscious of it (Rahner, 1974, iv: 54).

 

I would argue that what Rahner calls ‘mystery‘ is equivalent to what the Church Fathers called the ‘via negativa’ or what Nicholas de Cusa (in the middle-ages) called ‘learned ignorance’. Mafelsoli argues (1996) that,

 

Many of the spirit’s manifestations are aberrational…learned ignorance is lucid enough, perhaps realistic enough, simply to trace the jagged trajectory that characterises human experience (1996:53).

 

More traditionally Augustine speaks of grace or the Spirit, as prior to our experience of the world. Karl Rahner also speaks of what traditionally the Church has called ‘uncreated grace‘ as prior or basic to our natures. Uncreated grace is the indwelling of God in the soul. This means that we do not have to be changed by God to receive this indwelling. Speaking of the human person Rahner writes:

 

grace…always surrounds man, even the sinner and the unbeliever, as the inescapable setting of his existence (Rahner, 1974, TI iv: 181).

Rahner is referring to everyone here, both Christian and non-Christian. He is explaining the ubiquitous nature of grace and the fact that it reaches beyond the Christian community. Rahner’s notion that grace is everywhere is borne out by the fact that other religious traditions have a theology of grace. As McLeod (1980) shows, this is particularly evident in the thought of Guru Nanak. In the Sikh tradition grace is everywhere and available to all. Whether or not we state belief in these terms we cannot escape what most people express as God even though it may not come within the boundaries of what we can claim to know. <!–[if supportFields]&gt;PRIVATE &lt;![endif]–><!–[if supportFields]&gt;&lt;![endif]–>This, as I have argued, is because epistemological validity has often been identified with a scientific view of the world that strives for objective, scientific, empirical knowledge and rules out whatever does not conform to these rules. This is what Popper (1992) refers to as:

 

the problem of demarcation whereby the scientific value of a theory depends on its power to rule out or exclude, the occurrence of some possible events—to prohibit or forbid the occurrence of these events (Popper, 1992:41).

 

The theory of demarcation was meant to serve as the criteria of scientific enquiry. However, the view that objectivity and neutrality are paramount in the production of knowledge, and that the formulation of theology is void of vested interests, has meant that this criteria has been applied across different disciplines. Theology is not, I would argue, (as others have done) fundamentally about claims to objective knowledge. It is, perhaps, better described in Anselm’s terms. The theology I am constructing is not part of the epistemological process in the sense of cognitive thought, rather its epistemological concerns are those of the heart, a knowledge which is derived from a relationship to that which is ‘known’ or rather experienced. While this is a knowledge that could be said to be rational, in that it seeks to make itself understood, it is not knowledge that can really be added to the Enlightenment ideology of epistemology. Nevertheless, the women’s stories form part of the accumulated knowledge of diverse faith traditions, and many of the women’s insights can be seen to exist within those areas of the traditions which have not been distorted by patriarchal concerns. It is my argument then, that a theology of survival is not a purely subjective enterprise, but is part of a wider theological epistemology and is also an addition to the classical Christian idea of faith seeking understanding.

 

Although criteria of validity vary considerably from one discipline to another, each has its own ‘problems of demarcation.’ Because my research has been interdisciplinary there have been credible but difficult questions about truth and validity. Most social scientists will investigate and write about the practice of religion, with little or no reference to its revelatory claims. In this thesis, I use what may be termed a theological epistemology of transcendence, which is to say that I am taking as given, Rahner’s (1974, 1978) claim that all our knowledge is made possible through an a priori transcendence and without such an apriori no knowledge would be possible.

 

The rationalist attitudes towards knowledge that have been reviewed here remained dominant until well into the nineteenth century. They were, as many feminists have argued (Abbott and Wallace, 1997), a powerful force in determining what constituted knowledge and have had considerable effect on the structures of modern society. A similar critique of knowledge has also been mounted by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1966).

 

xi) Knowledge and Power

The work of thinkers such as Nietzsche (1886) and Foucault (1966) has emphasised the fact that knowledge is intimately tied to structures of power and domination. Foucault argues that it is power which produces and sustains knowledge. Anything that contradicts the authorised view of what counts as knowledge is seen as deviant and transgressional. Thus, he argues,

Power is that which says no. Any confrontation with power thus conceived appears only as transgression (1966: 53).

 

Feminist criticisms of knowledge and the way that knowledge is produced are a confrontation with power and authority. The tendency of many thinkers to neglect class, race, gender, and economic factors contributes to the exclusion of oppressed and marginal viewpoints thus further reinforcing both universalistic and objective models of knowledge and the power structures associated with this view. Foucault has argued that the enlightenment model of scientific reason only existed through the will to objectify and dominate. For Foucault, this kind of knowledge is inseparable from the desire for power. He argues that research into criminality or mental illness is often undertaken for the express purposes of legislation, and not for a desire for improvement in these areas (1966). These critiques of the structures of power have meant that epistemological questions are now a central issue within contemporary culture (Lennon and Whitford, 1994). The writings of Marx (1970), Foucault (1966), and members of the Frankfurt school (and in a different context liberation theologians) emphasise the fact knowledge claims are a reflection of the interests of those with economic power. More recently, black scholars and scholars from the third world have also indicated the Eurocentric and racist nature of most knowledge production (Lennon and Whitford, 1994). The separation of fact from value in knowledge production is not appropriate, that is to say knowledge is not objective and neutral. Rather, knowledge bears the stamp of its producers and is affected by their value systems.

Feminists (Daly, 1973, 1986 and Harding, 1987 et al) argue that the way in which the epistemological and theological tasks have often been undertaken has legitimised unbalanced epistemological and theological viewpoints. In this way feminism shares with thinkers such as Foucault (1966) and Myers (1994),

 

a critique of these ideals (economic power and Eurocentrism) and an awareness of the power/knowledge nexus which they so effectively disguise (Lennon and Whitford, 1994:1).

xii) Postmodernity and Feminism

Feminist critique has accentuated the modern/post-modern concerns by its claims that the way human nature was conceptualised by modernity has perpetuated an andro-centric bias within society, and in knowledge production. Feminist thinkers highlight the hegemonic nature of traditional knowledge and the positivist-empiricist orientation of most masculine epistemologies. It has also been argued, in the context of these same debates, that cultural and economic change is affecting traditional values and allegiances. Boundaries that were once seen as fixed are becoming more flexible (Graham, 1996). For some commentators the rise of feminism is seen to have hastened the trend towards fragmentation. The criticisms that feminism makes threatens previously held ideas of knowledge and selfhood (Graham, 1996). Thus bell hooks (1984) argues that,

 

The formation of an oppositional world view is necessary for feminist struggle. This means that the world we have most intimately known, the world in which we feel ’safe’ (even if such feelings are based on illusions) must be radically changed. Perhaps its is the knowledge that everyone must change, and not just those we label as enemies or oppressors, that has so far served to check our revolutionary impulses. Those revolutionary impulses must freely inform our theory and practice if feminist movement to end existing oppression is to progress, if we are to transform our present reality (Bell Hooks1984: 6).

 

The destabilising effects which a feminist viewpoint has had have further resulted in feminism as a whole being called post-modern. Thus some writers (Lyotard, 1984; Oddie, 1990) regard feminism as a post-modern movement because they say that attention to what may be seen as marginal viewpoints reduces the relevance of all epistemological claims and truth claims. For Lyotard, writing as a post-modernist, this is no bad thing. For Oddie and his criticisms of feminist theology, anything other than a modernist or universalising viewpoint threatens Christian doctrine and belief. However, not all feminists would regard themselves as post-modernist thinkers. Abbott and Wallace (1997) claim that a post-modernist standpoint,

 

Makes it possible to ignore the centrality and reality of male power - of the ways men oppress and subordinate women by, for example, sexual harassment, date rape, domestic violence and so on (Abbott and Wallace, 1997:47).

 

I would argue that the modern/post-modern debate is simply another feature of the dualistic nature of Western thinking. What I mean by this is that knowledge is generally categorised under one heading or the other. Positivist or scientific knowledge (purportedly objective) is modernist and interpretative situated knowledge such as feminist knowledge is regarded as post-modern. Certainly some feminists believe that the charge of postmodernism is an attempt to deny the relevance of women’s experience in the production of knowledge. It is because of this that there is a major tension between those thinkers who term themselves postmodernist, and many feminist thinkers. This tension stems from the perception that some post-modernist thinkers, and in particular, Richard Rorty (1986), have given up any claims to solidarity. This tension holds, despite Rorty’s claim to sustain solidarity (Graham, 1996). West (1991) has shown that Rorty’s critique of history is epistemological and remains silent about economic and sexual injustice.

 

West’s criticism underscores the complaints which feminists have about this kind of thinking. While Rorty actually tries to rethink notions of solidarity with his use of the human experience of pain, much of what he has to say is problematic from a feminist understanding of solidarity. Rorty does not deal with the injustices which have occurred in history. In this way Rorty denies a shared human history, one in which women have struggled against invisibility. From a feminist viewpoint, Rorty’s attempt to rethink solidarity, while at the same time denying history, is a denial of feminism’s struggle for women’s rights. History and solidarity are, they argue, crucial in the struggle for human rights, equality, and justice (Cannon, 1985; Tamez, 1987, 1989) and the lack of attention to women’s historical invisibility is a denial of that solidarity (Graham, 1996).

Graham (1996) has argued that what Rorty has done is to critique traditional epistemology without addressing the oppressions that have occurred under colonialism and capitalism. He has, at the same time ignored the notions of freedom and justice which were also part of the Enlightenment project and which are important to feminist thought, and to the struggles of all the oppressed.

 

xiii) Feminist Epistemology

Feminist epistemologies struggle to have women’s understandings of the world legitimated as knowledge. A claim to the universality and neutrality of knowledge undermines women’s claims to know. This has resulted in the label of relativism being given to anything which is not universally applicable. Thus, women’s attempts to base knowledge claims on their experiences of the world are viewed as marginal to traditional epistemological discourse (Lennon and Whitford, 1994). The power relationships within the production of knowledge are not simply reducible to gender hierarchies but include issues of economics, race, and class. Nevertheless, the axis of gender oppression in the production of knowledge is central to feminist concerns. They argue that gender oppression is often accompanied by other oppressions (Abbott and Wallace, 1997; Grant, 1989; Brooks-Thistlethwaite, 1990). Women who are disadvantaged because of their sex may also be at a further disadvantage through their economic situation, their race, or their class. Feminists, therefore, see the need to address all forms of oppression and domination in their struggle to liberate women. Women’s experiences of the world cannot be said to be the same as men’s experiences because they experience things from the vantage point of subordination. As Janet Martin Soskice (1993) commented in a paper on “Christ and Context”, “the truth looks different from here.” The standpoint of women, therefore, in Church, academy, and the wider society, is one of subordination. It is the subordination of women to men and male oriented disciplines that must be examined and overcome (Abbott and Wallace, 1997).

 

Until the last twenty years or so most empirical research has been carried out by men. Feminists see this as a situation which needs rectifying (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). It has meant that most research sampling has been drawn from the male half of the population, and framed in malespeak. Gender has been just another variable (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). In addition to this, the acceptance by sociology of the biological essentialism expressed by Darwin has meant that,

 

Malestream sociology has in the main seen women’s roles as natural and therefore not investigated or problematised them; sociology’s tools, concepts, and theories have been developed to investigate the public world of men and are inadequate for investigating the world that women inhabit and the relationships between men and women (Abbott and Wallace, 1997:4 ).

 

While there is a growing body of feminist work, it does not serve the same foundational basis as traditional scientific knowledge. This is because of its situated and specific nature. This allows a continuation of the ideology that knowledge drawn from a particular perspective is universally valid. Therefore power is invested in the male (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). The epistemological enterprise for feminists is a political enterprise. This again excludes their point of view from mainstream philosophy which has regarded the content of its work as free from political concerns. Abbott and Wallace (1997) argue that challenges to ‘malestream sociology’ and knowledge production have contributed to women’s political subordination. In view of this, they maintain that researchers should bear in mind that women’s subjectivity,

 

Has to be understood in a structural relationship with men-a relationship of subordination and exploitation (Abbott and Wallace, 1997:3).

 

Some feminists now highlight a further epistemological concern, and that is the problematic nature of the differences between women. While critical attention to gender is a focus for all feminist research, the research process may differ from group to group. Harding (1987) in particular argues for recognition of the situated nature of all our knowledge claims. One of the biggest problems that feminists have with Enlightenment thinking is that it ignores the specificity of the knowing subject. This, I would argue, is further exacerbated because Western feminism has, of necessity, drawn on Enlightenment concepts of freedom and equality. These concepts have in themselves a universalising tendency. The entrance of more marginal discourses such as those of poor women, or women of colour, into the academic arena might serve to stem these tendencies. Many feminist researchers now see the inclusion of these discourses as a matter of ethical priority. Lennon and Whitford (1994) argue that difference should not cause us to turn aside, rather they should command our respect for what they say Brehier (1994) has called “the ethical other.” The real problem that feminist epistemologies raise is centred on the experiential nature of this knowledge.

 

Modern Western epistemology, has tended to stress the primacy of objective, factual knowledge, an example being that the constituents of water are two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen. However, in the main, we live our lives according to values deriving from awareness and personal experience. This existential knowledge has a priority over objective knowing. Feminists have highlighted how women’s existential knowledge has been obscured through the discourses of patriarchal society.

 

My own epistemological focus is on the knowledge constructions of a specific group of women whose identity has been shaped by domestic abuse, and by social and cultural marginalisation. This marginalisation has been strengthened by the fact that claims of neutrality in knowledge production have prevented people from seeing that knowledge is power. The ideological structures of modernity blind both the powerless, and those in power to the real situation in society. This upholds and stabilises unequal power relationships that are epitomised in the patriarchal ordering of social structures.

 

xiv) Patriarchy

This thesis is based upon an underlying analysis of the existence and operations of patriarchy. Patriarchy is an ideology that supports and legitimates existing hierarchical, social structures that are male oriented. Inherent in the meaning of patriarchy is the notion that one set of people is inferior and therefore subject to another.

 

Patriarchy is the power of the fathers, a familial, social, ideological, political system in which men, by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labour, determine what part women shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male (Rich, 1976:40).

 

Many feminists argue that patriarchy is not simply a result of biological determinism (having one’s role defined by one’s reproductive functions) but has been influenced by social and economic processes which have further defined gender roles (Graham, 1995). Gender is a category of human experience that divides men and women. It involves a dualistic pattern of relationships where women are seen as opposite to men and where biological differences are used as an argument for other differences (Graham, 1995).

 

Dualism is a condition where things are seen only in their opposites (usually to women’s detriment) thus, the spirit/matter split, where the male is seen as spiritual and the female is equated with matter. It has become a central category of Western thought. Religions are not immune from the effects of patriarchal thinking or of social and economic processes. Rather, as liberation and feminist theological critiques (Gutierrez, 1973; Fiorenza, 1984, 1990; King, 1995; et al) show, they are integral to it. Religion, therefore, can help to support the continuation of those processes. Research in the United States of America, (Niebhur, R 1952; Greeley, 1970) and in Britain (Wilson, 1982), has shown that the religions and cultures which people inherit serve to instil attitudes which support existing ideologies such as capitalism, racism and sexism. The encouragement of these attitudes by religion means that they, and the ideologies that they support, are, in some sense, seen to be virtues.

 

Gender oppression, racism, class, and monetary oppression, have all, at various times, appealed to ‘evidence’ from scriptural sources. Many of the modern theological and sociological debates about ideologies are grounded in the writings of Karl Marx (1970) and his critique of capitalism, class, and political and religious structures. While the theories of Marx and his contemporary Engels, may not have directly addressed the specificity of women’s experiences, it could be argued that they might, nevertheless, have been part of the cause of women’s advancement in the twentieth century. Their analysis of the economic organisation of society was reflected in the egalitarian principles of family law which were enshrined in the Soviet constitution (Hart, 1997). It has often been with the use of a Marxist hermeneutic that feminists have questioned the masculine economic and epistemic privilege that has existed in almost all societies.

 

The work of these women has resulted in exposing the gendered nature of much Western thought and discourse (Bordo, S, 1990). Walby (1986) is of the opinion that there needs to be a dual analysis of patriarchy and capitalism. Women are still, in many instances, an invisible part of the workforce because housework and child rearing are not counted as labour under masculinist systems. The prevalence of this attitude in society has meant that many survivors of domestic violence are seen both by those in power and by the public at large as a burden on the state. On leaving abusive relationships, these women become sole caregivers and providers for their children, and this makes them part of an increasing number of lone parent families. As single parents, many of them have to live on handouts from a state benefits’ system that takes no account of their labour in the home. On the contrary, as recent benefit reform shows, these parents are seen as ‘scroungers’. This kind of legislation entrenches the idea that a woman’s care of her family, and her work in the home, is of little consequence. It is this kind of injustice that led feminists to argue that women have to become more active and aware of their role in society and in the production of knowledge. This knowledge should, furthermore,

 

Enable us to make sense of our lives and to understand the ways in which we are oppressed and exploited by men (Abbott and Wallace, 1997:284).

 

A patriarchal society, by its very nature, regards the male as the norm. This provides ideological justification for the subordinate position of women in the academy, in society, in religion, and in personal relationships, (Abbott and Wallace, 1997). Patriarchy is a system that polarises the sexes and authorises the scripts by which men and women live out their lives. It is a system of domination and, although one half of society may appear to have more freedom than the other half, there are areas where this is not the case. Freedom that is attained by domination is, arguably, an illusion because it traps both the oppressed and the oppressor in what is seen to be a suitable system. Any attempt by either side to do other than that which is ordained by the system is regarded as deviant and subversive. The subjection of woman to man is maintained by the widespread exclusion of women from positions of power, as can be seen in all the areas mentioned above. When women are perceived as challenging patriarchal patterns of relationships, they are viewed as deviant. Thus, for example, the old music hall jokes about women who wear the trousers. Sayings such as ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle,’ reinforce the view that it is a man’s right to rule over a woman. Patriarchal ideology, therefore, perpetuates the inequalities that pertain between women and men, and, as Hamington (1996) argues contains within it a rationale for violence.

 

xv) Domestic Violence

Domestic violence refers to violence occurring between partners in an ongoing relationship and may include verbal abuse, physical abuse, and mental abuse and intimidation (Abbott, fact sheet, U.O.D, 1995).

 

Dobash and Dobash (1992) estimate that at some time in their lives more than forty percent of women experience violence, and, furthermore, that in most of these cases this violence is at the hands of a man. Research undertaken in Glasgow, (Smythe, 1998) suggests that this figure may be an underestimate as many such assaults go unrecorded. This is due in part to the fact that most women who are battered experience a sense of shame (Hoff, 1990). My own research has shown that in spite of reforms and consciousness raising efforts, many women who do report violence find the attitudes of doctors, of the police, and of court officials, to be less than helpful. Feminists who work with women who have experienced violence say that many of them deny what is happening to them. In America the greatest number of injuries to women occurs in the home and the figure is higher than the number of those injured in road accidents, mugging, or those suffering from cancer combined (Abbott, 1995).

 

The reason most domestic assaults are denied or go unreported is, at least in part, a result of society’s refusal to recognise such assaults as an infringement of women’s human rights (Dobash and Dobash, 1992). There is still, in many areas of society, the idea that a woman who is the victim of her partner’s violence, is in some way responsible for his behaviour. This is not surprising. Until the nineteenth century in England, the legal position was not whether a man had beaten his wife, but how severe the beating was.

 

The saying ‘a rule of thumb’ comes from one legal judgement that a man could legally beat his wife with a stick, provided it was no thicker than his thumb. (Abbott and Wallace, 1997:247).

 

It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that these assaults became illegal. Society, however, still holds a battered woman as responsible for what has happened to her. The tendency to blame battered women for what happens to them is also evident in much of the research that investigates female violence towards men. Most of the evidence for this is based on the fact that some battered women retaliate in self-defence; this is seen (by some researchers, by many court officials, and by social workers) as a matter which warrants greater concern than the violent behaviour of men towards women. Women who retaliate are seen as deviant. They

 

—use significantly more violence than non-battered groups (Barnett et al 1996:225).

 

The focus of this research was that battered women tended to be more violent than non-battered groups. It might be argued that these research findings are hardly surprising. If someone comes at you with a heavy instrument, or flailing fists, the natural reaction is self-defence! The woman who does not defend herself is usually too cowed to do so and may find herself admitted to a psychiatric ward. The point is that research such as this, still results in attribution of blame to the woman. It also presents battered women as anti-social, and incapable of living a normal life. The presentation of stereotypical images of battered women as deviant is, I would argue, part of the same mental process which regards the poor man as work-shy, the Muslim as a religious fanatic, and the Jew as a Shylock. Statistical research into such sensitive areas can, arguably, give a distorted picture of people’s lives. One wonders whether Disraeli was right in his statement, “there are lies, damned lies, and statistics” (Blake, R 1969).

 

In spite society’s view and of the ideology that brands her a permanent victim, large numbers of battered women find the means of personal empowerment and survival. The idea that women who survive domestic violence might have an optimistic view of life contradicts much of the research findings into the lives of abused women. Many of these findings present them as helpless and permanent victims incapable of running their own lives. I have drawn the concept of survival as used within this thesis from a number of sources, the most important being the narratives from which this theology is constructed. Hoff, (1990) shows that Antonovesky’s (1987) findings from his research into concentration camp survivors clearly implied that survival indicated an inclination towards health and wholeness, a sense that things had to get better.

xvi) Survival

In my use of the concept of survival I have drawn heavily on the research of Lee Ann Hoff (1990). Hoff’s findings show, that abused women use friend and family networks as a means of coping with, and surviving the violence they have experienced. A further source that has proved fruitful has been Jewish post-Holocaust theologies. I have also drawn on the writings of Black theologians, Womanist theologians and Mujerista theologians. All these theologies concentrate on the struggle of oppressed peoples to survive. What I am presenting is primarily a feminist theology. This does not preclude, however, the fact that in an age that questions the role and experience of the gendered subject, men also may have a theology of survival. Survival encompasses the idea of resistance, a refusal to go under and a feeling that eventually things will turn out for the best (Antonovsky, 1987). Conversely, this feeling of optimism may encourage battered women to remain in an abusive relationship, hoping for change. While this is the case for many women, there is, for most of them, a realisation that this change is not going to happen as long as they remain in the abusive situation. One of the attributes that survivors develop is the ability to adapt themselves and their thinking. The Concise Oxford dictionary (eighth ed., 1990) definition of the word ’survive’ is,

To continue to exist, to remain alive after going through, or continue to exist in spite of a danger, accident etc.

 

The word existence is rather basic and conveys something less than human, whereas for many survivors there is recognition that life itself is sweet, and so living is always more than simply existing. The difference is one of attitude, something with which the concentration camp survivor Victor Frankl (1963) was concerned in his writings. He believed that we always have a choice over how we feel about a situation, and consequently, what, within certain parameters, we do about it.

 

Women who survive domestic violence have chosen to believe that domestic abuse is wrong. They may not consciously name themselves feminists. Nevertheless, their struggle for justice for themselves and for others who have been abused implies, I would argue, the growth of a feminist consciousness. It is my contention that the knowledge and beliefs of ordinary women are important to the feminist enterprise of bringing women’s experiences into academic debate.

5. Conclusion

The central question of this thesis asks if it is possible for women whose role within religious traditions has been culturally constructed by patriarchy, to relate positively to those traditions. From my research, it was clear that religion had been, in varying degrees, a factor in the survival strategies of the women in the study. As I have argued the main objectives of the thesis are to contribute new understandings to the construction of feminist epistemologies and to the construction of feminist theological theories, and their relationship to the wider theological debates. This will be done by exploring the significance of religion in the survival of the women interviewed in conversation with academic feminist theology. Then, the significance of a survival theology within the context of the wider religious and theological arenas will be examined. In order to achieve this it is first necessary to look at more marginalised theologies and at the question of contextualisation. Contextualisation is something that will become increasingly important as the thesis progresses, particularly in the chapter on feminist theologies and women’s experiences. The emphasis in situated theologies is on doing theology rather than on dictating what a group or community should believe. It is, as liberation theologians have argued, a completely different way of formulating theology. The following chapter begins with the argument that all theology is, or should be, contextual and then introduces a range of situated theologies.

 

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